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Drawing on a costbenefit perspective, this paper explores the relation between information 
asymmetry and the decision to delist from stock exchanges during periods of uncertainty. Specifically, 
it investigates the role of firms’ intangible investments and the availability of alternative sources of 
finance on the decision to delist from foreign stock markets. 
 
 	!	!

The study takes advantage of a natural experiment in which crosslisted Chinese firms facing 
uncertainty in US markets due to widespread allegations of accounting fraud, decide on whether to 
remain listed or voluntarily delist. Here, the decision to delist is modeled as a function of the level of 
information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders, and the availability of alternative 
financing, while controlling for other drivers of firms’ delisting decision. The data used in the 
empirical analyses covers a handcollected sample of 91 Chinese firms voluntarily delisting from US 
stock markets between 2010 and 2016. This sample is matched with an equal sample of Chinese 
firms, which remained listed in US stock markets during the same period. A probit regression model 
accounting for fixedeffects is used. The study also uses probit model interaction effects to capture the 
mediating effect of alternative financing on the intangiblesdelisting nexus. 
 
"

There is a significant positive relationship between investments in intangible assets and firms’ 
decision to delist. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the positive intangiblesdelisting nexus is 
accentuated by the availability of alternative sources of financing. Collectively, the results are 
consistent with the theoretical argument that the higher informatio  asymmetry associated with 
intangible assets may increase the cost of staying listed on stock exchanges, particularly, in periods of 
uncertainty (captured in this study by accounting fraud allegations targeting crosslisted firms). The 
results have important implications for corporate managers, capital market participants, and policy 
makers.

 
#!$	

The study exploits a unique natural experimental setting to explore why crosslisted firms delist. The 
underlying theoretical framework to explain delisting is new. This framework captures the role of 
information asymmetry, uncertainty and alternative financing in explaining the cost and benefits of 
remaining listed on a foreign market. 

	
 Voluntary delisting; Intangible assets; Information asymmetry; US stock exchange; China. 
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The liberalisation of capital markets, as well as, technological progress over the last three decades 
has created new opportunities for firms to seek development and growth beyond their national 
borders. Prior studies (see e.g., Merton, 1987; Stulz, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Karolyi, 2006; 
Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Eng and Ling, 2012) have explored the motivations of foreign firms 
listing in US stock markets. The extant research suggests that foreign firms crosslist into the US 
market to gain access to lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010), 
greater investor recognition (Merton, 1987), or as a commitment mechanism to the stricter US 
regulations and investor protection rights (Stulz, 1999; Karolyi, 2006; Eng and Ling, 2012). Clearly, 
besides stricter regulations, there are other costs associated with listing on more sophisticated markets, 
most notably, greater information disclosure requirements (Eng and Ling, 2012) and increased 
scrutiny by stakeholders such as analysts and the press. While the extant research explores the 
motivations underlying firms’ listings in foreign markets, it is unclear how these associated cost 
influences delisting decisions. The case of crosslisted Chinese firms in US markets provides a natural 
setting to explore this issue. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, established in 1992, allowed Chinese firms to 
crosslist. This led to a surge in the number of Chinese firms listing in foreign markets, particularly in 
the US. As in Figure 1, the number of Chinese firms listing on US markets increased successively 
each year from 2001, reaching its peak in 2007. Noticeably, Chinese firms’ listings on US markets 
significantly reduced to 11 in 2011, representing a 96% decline from the previous year. Concurrently, 
as shown in Table 2, a wave of voluntary delisting also emerged.1 Recent figures suggest that between 
2010 and 2015, there were over 80 delisting announcements from US stock exchanges involving 
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Chinese firms. This wave of delisting has been attributed to loss of investor confidence following 
reports of fraudulent accounting practices in some Chinese USlisted firms (Song and Zeng, 2012).  
'()*+
",*)
%-

Notably, a survey report released by Muddy Waters Research Company in June 2010 suggested 
that some USlisted Chinese firms (e.g. Orient Paper) were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. 
Similarly, Citron Research reported accounting fraud and bribery scandals involving Evergrande Real 
Estate Group (a high profile Chinese firm). Even though these claims were unsubstantiated, 
Evergrande Real Estate Group lost HK$8 billion of its market value. Arguably, these scrutiny, 
allegations, exposure and suspicion relating to accounting fraud instigated a mass exodus of Chinese 
firms from US stock markets (see Song and Zeng, 2012; Liu  2016; Zhang, 2012). Interestingly, 
some Chinese firms maintained their US listing. 
The case of Chinese firms delisting from US exchanges between 2010 and 2016 creates a natural 
experimental setting to explore the decisions of crosslisted firms under uncertainty. This article, 
therefore, examines whether firms with a higher perceived cost of crosslisting embark on delisting 
for precautionary reasons. Here, the paper utilises firmlevel intangible investments (which capture 
the level of information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders) to proxy for the level of scrutiny 
that firms potentially face when investors suspect accounting fraud. Drawing from the costbenefit 
perspective on why firms become public (see, Maupin  ., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012), the paper argues that when investors (notably US
based) associate crosslisted (Chinese) firms with accounting fraud, the cost of remaining listed 
becomes asymmetrically higher for those firms with high information asymmetry (proxied by 
intangibles).2 Consequently, it is posited that the presence of intangible assets increases (reduces) the 
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costs (net benefits) of being listed on overseas’ markets, resulting in a higher propensity to delist in 
times of uncertainty (i.e., when crosslisted firms are susceptible to accounting fraud allegations). To 
corroborate this benefitcost argument, the paper considers how the delisting decision is shaped by a 
firm’s propensity to secure alternative private funding.  
The present article contributes to the scant but growing literature on publictoprivate 
transactions (PTPs) by providing evidence that possibly explains why crosslisted firms faced with 
uncertainty respond differently, i.e., some remain listed while others delist. Thus, the study’s analysis 
documents the fundamental drivers (beyond the investor confidence crisis) of firms’ voluntary 
delisting decisions. Moreover, it contributes to this PTPs literature which has largely focused on 
transactions of firms in the advanced economies of the US and the UK, often using dated data (see, 
e.g. Renneboog et al., 2007; Marosi and Massoud, 2007;
 Pour and Laser, 2013), with empirical 
studies on firms from emerging economies like China being rare.3  
This paper relates to, but also differs from recent research by Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) 
and Pour and Laser (2013). Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) examine the factors motivating 
foreign firms to delisting from US stock exchanges over the period 19622006, while the current 
article specifically considers the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US markets for a more 
recent period (20102016) when there was a foreign investor confidence crisis. Similarly, Pour and 
Laser (2013) analyse the motives and market valuations of voluntary delisting from the London Stock 
Exchange during 19952009. They mainly focus on firms’ capital structure rebalancing as a driver of 
their delisting decisions, whereas the primary focus of the current study is on the role of intangible 
assets in driving the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges. Focusing on 
intangible assets is important given the increasing prominence of intangible assets visàvis 
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investments in capital expenditure by firms in recent years (Anagnostopoulou, 2008; Borisova and 
Brown, 2013). For example, Borisova and Brown (2013) report the ratio of R&D spending to total 
assets in 2008 to be around 10% compared to a capital expenditure ratio of about 4% for publicly 
listed companies with coverage in the 	
 database.            

The results, based on a probit analysis of 91 voluntary delisting announcements by Chinese firms 
listed on US markets during the sevenyear period, 2010 to 2016, and a carefully selected control 
sample, show that investments in intangible assets are a significant driver of firms’ voluntary delisting 
decisions, after controlling for other determinants of the delisting decision. Specifically, the results 
show a delisting probability of 11% for an average firm in the sample that undertakes average levels 
of intangible investments. The paper further finds the delisting probability to be even higher, ranging 
from 2022%, for those firms with the topmost intangible investments (e.g. firms with abovemedian 
or top 25% investments in intangibles). Moreover, the evidence suggests that firms with higher 
intangible investments are more likely delist from stock markets when they have alternative sources 
of financing such as a prior successful equity issue or a thriving internal capital market.  
The results align with the article’s proposed theoretical framework. The framework contends that 
the higher information asymmetry and valuation challenges associated with intangible investments 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008) increase (decrease) the costs (net benefits) of remaining listed on stock 
exchanges, particularly when there is market uncertainty. The results are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Maupin  ., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 
2012) suggesting that firms tend to consider both costs and benefits in making their delisting 
decisions. Finally, the results have important implications for corporate managers, capital market 
participants, and policy makers.         
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the context of the study 
and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methods. Section 5 
presents and discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
.& +	





	
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
One of the features of becoming a public firm in advanced economies is the intense media and 
analysts’ coverage/scrutiny (Eng and Ling, 2012). These analysts together with the press play an 
important role as an information intermediary in financial markets by often identifying corporate 
financial malfeasance and broadcasting them. Miller (2006) describes them as the “watchdog” of 
corporate America. Existing research on the relations between information intermediaries (e.g. the 
press, analysts, etc.) and commerce suggests that these “watchdogs” do not only shape public 
perceptions of firms, but they also have a significant influence on financial market participants 
(Zingales, 2000; Jensen, 1979; Miller, 2000). Miller (2000) shows that in 29% of the cases of 
accounting violations that he studied in his US sample, the press had published articles regarding 
accounting fraud prior to a public acknowledgment by the firm or US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the markets reacted negatively in most cases. He concludes that the press, through 
its exposure of accounting fraud, actually provides investors with valuable infor ation, especially 
when their reports are backed by some investigations/research.  
Prior literature suggests that analysts’ and press reports on accounting irregularities in public 
corporations adversely affect the fortunes of the public firm through loss of reputation (Karpoff  
2008), and ultimately, substantial decreases in stock prices (Feroz  1991; Dechow  1996; 
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Miller, 2000). This suggests that besides the upfront cost of going public (e.g. admission fees), firms 
face additional risk/cost of intense scrutiny, particularly in relation to potential accounting fraud. 
Clearly, these additional costs may eventually outweigh the benefits of remaining listed (for example, 
in periods of high uncertainty), motivating some listed firms to delist. 
 
			

Highprofile allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms in US stock markets in 2010 
and 2012 increased levels of uncertainty and, perhaps, the fraudrelated listing cost, for this particular 
group of firms. The first major allegation was published on 28th June 20104 by Muddy Waters 
Research LLC (Muddy Waters), a US privatelyheld investment firm that specialises in conducting 
investigative research and due diligence on public companies. Muddy Waters reported of egregious 
accounting fraud in Orient Paper Inc. (ONP)5, a Chinese company listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange, and boldly concluded as follows: “	 !		
  
	  	 
	 	 	” The report cited specific accounting 
irregularities including ONP overstating its 2008 and 2009 revenue by 27 and 40 times respectively, 
overvaluing its assets by at least 10 times, and misappropriating approximately US$30 million since 
October, 2009, among others. The report concluded with a “	 ” recommendation. This 
incident did not just cause substantial damage to ONP, but it also heightened market fears that other 
Chinese public corporations may be involved in similar fraudulent accounting practices (Zhang, 
2012).  
Two years later (on 21st June 20126), Citron Research, a USbased analyst, made another high 
profile financial fraud allegation against Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited (Evergrande), a 
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public Chinese firm. Citron Research claimed that: “…"#    	#
	
 	  	
	 	 #$”. The report 
detailed that Evergrande used bribery of local government officials and various “	%” to 
hide its insolvency, and that a total writedown of RMB 71 billion is required to move the company’s 
reported equity from RMB 35 billion to # RMB 36 billion. While the report was 
unsubstantiated, on the day of the accounting fraud allegation, the company’s share closed 11.4% 
down, compared to only a 1.3% decline on the market index. The allegation wipedoff over HK$8 
billion from Evergrande’s market value, causing panic among some Chinese public companies and 
possibly motivating them to exit US stock exchanges (Liu   2016). What followed these 
allegations was a reduction in the number of Chinese firms listing on US stock exchanges and a 
concurrent increase in the number of voluntary delisting.  
 
/& *		
		

		
			


&	
'
The extant literature advances several reasons to explain firms’ decision to delist. Firstly, from an 
agency perspective, managers with freecash flows and low growth prospects might chose to waste 
cash on nonvalueincreasing projects (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi   2017). Delisting can curb 
agency conflicts by paying out excess cash or leveraging to repurchase stock (Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989; Kieschnick, 1998). Secondly, from a governance perspective, powerful CEOs might delist, 
possibly, to avoid the intense scrutiny and regulation associated with being a public firm (Weir  
2005a; Weir  2005b; Manuela and Giovanna, 2012).  
Thirdly, from an information asymmetry perspective, managers may choose to delist when they 
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perceive their stock as being undervalued, limiting their ability to raise finance (e.g. Maupin  
1984, Renneboog  2007; Weir  2005b). Firms have also been shown to delist for pragmatic 
reasons, e.g., low trading volumes in US markets, the ability of home markets to meet capital their 
capital needs, and increased cost and complexity of US market regulations such as the Sarbanes
Oxley Act (Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; 
Pour and Laser, 2013). 
 
&(		$#
				
Firms, perhaps, evaluate the net benefit of remaining listed in a dynamic context where both firm
level and countrylevel (both home and foreign) factors change over time, when deciding whether to 
remain listed. Within this context, the allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms listed 
on US markets may have increased investors’ uncertainty over the true value of Chinese public firms, 
particularly, for firms with high levels of difficulttovalue intangible assets. Chinese firms, within this 
context, also face heightened uncertainty due to increased scrutiny by analysts who may provide 
wrong forecasts (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). These information asymmetries and uncertainties reduce 
investors’ willingness to fund investments, and consequently reducing firms’ access to new equity 
and/or increasing their underlying cost of capital. This paper argues that this tension, partly, offsets the 
expected benefits of remaining listed on US markets. 
Empirical evidence on the role of intangible assets on corporate delisting decisions is rare in the 
US and UKfocused literature, and virtually nonexistent for emerging economies. The few studies 
that include R&D or intangibles in their analysis have them as control variables to proxy for 
information asymmetry, and report mixed results. For example, Pour and Laser (2013) provide weak 
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evidence for a positive association between intangible assets and firms’ delisting decisions, but 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that the estimated coefficients for 
intangible asset ratios are insignificant, implying that information asymmetry is not a factor in the 
delisting decision. 
The current article contributes to this literature by hypothesising that, within the context of 
heightened uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms following recent series of 
reports of accounting fraud, the levels of intangible investments played a crucial role in Chinese firms’ 
decision to delist from the US stock exchanges. This is primarily because firms’ intangible 
investments, within this context, impede their ability to issue new equity at a reasonable cost (i.e. one 
of the benefits of being listed), thereby, shaping their overall costs and net benefits of remaining 
listed. By their very nature, intangible investments attract greater analyst coverage and are more 
susceptible to analyst forecast errors, thereby, having serious consequences on firm valuations 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008). Barth   (2001) find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for 
R&Dintensive firms and industries. Amir   (2003) also find analyst forecast errors to be 
positively related to investments in intangibles, demonstrating analysts’ lack of understanding of the 
implications of intangibles on firms’ future profitability.  
Further and in response to the valuation difficulties associated with intangible assets, accounting 
rules tend to be stringent on intangible investments, requirement frequent assessments and charging 
impairment losses, but also creates room for managerial manipulations of financial statements. Watts 
(2003) notes that that the current global accounting standard on goodwill and impairment (IFRS 3) 
which allows for managerial discretion may motivate managerial optimism and earnings management, 
and worsen investors’ suspicion of fraud in connection with intangible assets. Consistent with this 
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prediction, Sun and Zhang (2017) find a negative relationship between goodwill impairment losses 
and bond credit ratings, suggesting that firms with goodwill impairment losses (i.e. high intangible
firms) obtain lower credit ratings. In an attempt to avoid credit ratings downgrade, for example, 
managers may be motivated to understate impairment losses. Based on a sample of Australian firms, 
Bepari and Mollick (2017) report that the adoption of goodwill impairment approach (under IFRS 3) 
has decreased the frequency and the amount of goodwill writeoffs that would have been required 
under the systematic amortisation regime (old standard). 
Collectively, the literature suggests that investments in intangibles are inherently risky, more 
susceptible to managerial manipulation and accounting fraud, attract greater analyst coverage, and are 
subject to greater analysts’ forecast errors. Therefore, in periods of general market uncertainty, public 
firms with higher investments in intangibles may incur greater costs of remaining listed, and are (thus) 
more likely to delist. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
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The nexus between the decision to delist and intangible investments is likely to be accentuated by 
the availability or otherwise of alternative sources of financing for firms. For listed firms with high 
intangibles but without the ability to fund their intangible investment projects internally or from 
external debt, their net benefits for remaining listed may be relatively higher, making them less likely 
to delist. On the contrary, when firms have suitable and less costly means of financing (e.g., from 
accumulated reserves, prior equity issues, or even from banks), their net benefit of remaining listed is 
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reduced, making them more likely to delist from stock markets, in periods of high market uncertainty. 
Since large, mature, and established firms tend to be able to access alternative funding sources 
(Muller and Zimmermann, 2008; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), we expect such firms to have a 
greater likelihood to delist when they have high levels of intangible assets. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis is proposed for testing: 
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To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, a sample of all privatisation announcements over seven fiscal years 
(2010 and 2016) by Chinese firms listed on major US stock exchanges is collected, regardless of 
whether the privatisation process completed successfully. This was to reflect the objective of 
investigating the role of intangible investments on firms’ 		. It is considered that public 
privatisation announcements by firms are preceded by an earlier decision to delist. However, for 
simplicity, the paper refers to these firms making privatisation announcements as delisting firms (or 
delist sample).  
The data on Chinese firms delisting from US stock exchanges, specifically information on firms’ 
name and dates of delisting announcement, are handcollected from three prominent Chinese financial 
webbased platforms (2, 3+ and 4).7 All the other data for the study including 
the IPO dates and financial/accounting data are collected from the 41$5 The 
search identified 94 USlisted Chinese companies that had publicly announced their decision to delist 
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during 20102016, an average of 13 per year. It is worth noting that Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) 
report an average annual delisting of 16 	 firms from US markets between 1962 and 2006. 
These statistics suggest disproportionately higher delisting announcements by Chinese firms from US 
exchanges in recent years relative to other foreign firms.  
Due to data constraints, three of the 94 delisting firms drop out of the sample, leaving a final 
sample of 91 Chinese firms delisting from four major US stock exchanges9 over the 20102016 
period. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by stock exchange and industry of the delisting 
firms. Over half of the sample firms (58%) exit the NASDAQ, with another 32% exiting the NYSE. 
The remaining 10% of the sample predominantly delist from other OTC markets. Perhaps, the 
relatively less restrictive listing requirements of NASDAQ make it a preferred capital market for 
Chinese firms. Noticeably, almost half (44%) of the sample firms are from the Information 
Technology industry which generally tends to be R&Dintensive. This provides some early anecdotal 
evidence of a possible link between intangible investments and corporate delisting transactions. 
'()*+
+12)
%
3)*)-

Table 2 displays the sample distribution by year of delisting announcement, year of listing (i.e. 
IPO), as well as, by the number of trading years firms had been on the stock exchange before 
delisting. As can be seen, the highest number of delisting announcements (30) was observed in 2015, 
which coincides with the year immediately following the accounting fraud allegation by Citron 
Research against Evergrande. Similarly, the second and third highest numbers of delisting 
announcements were observed within the twoyear period (20112012) after Muddy Waters reported 
of fraudulent accounting in Orient Paper Inc. in 2010. These statistics, perhaps, provide some basis for 
public opinion that the recent wave of delisting of Chinese firms from US exchanges is a response to 
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the accounting fraud allegations involving Chinese firms. 
IPO information suggests that the sample firms were listed in US stock exchanges between 2000 
and 2014, with the highest listing in any single year (27 firms) observed in 2007. Only 17 firms (19%) 
listed on US markets after 2010 (postONP fraud allegations) and none listed after 2014 (post
Evergrande fraud allegations). Again, these statistics suggest that the accounting fraud allegations 
might have reduced the appetite of Chinese firms for US stock markets. Finally, at the time of 
delisting, majority of sample firms (almost 70%) had traded on the US markets for five years or less, 
suggesting that most sample firms may lack sufficient experience of operating in US stock exchanges.  
'()*+
+12)
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The main empirical approach of the paper is a probit regression model predicting the probability 
of a firm delisting from the stock exchange conditional on its intangible investments and a set of 
control variables. The dependent variable is equal to one for voluntary delisted firms and zero for 
control firms. Similar to previous studies (e.g. Pour and Laser, 2013), each Chinese delisted firm 
(delist sample) is matched with a Chinese firm that remained listed (control sample) on US markets 
based on industry, size, and IPO date. The final empirical analysis is based on a sample of 91 delisting 
firms and 91 nondelisting controls, i.e., an overall sample of 182 observations.  
The baseline probit model for the empirical analysis is specified below in Eq. (1): 
%
%
%
% 6!71 +++== ∑
=
−− βββ
1
1
1121)1(                                   Eq. (1) 
where:  refers to the probability of firm  delisting from the US stock exchange, the s represent the 
intercept ( ), the coefficient for intangible assets ratio (IAR) ( ), and for the control variables (
β
1β 2β %β
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). The is the random error term assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic. 1−!7
represents a oneperiod lagged value of the firm’s intangible investments, the primary variable of 
interest, which is predicted to be positively related to corporate delisting decision (3). Finally, 1−%6
in Eq. (1) represents one of the following lagged % control variables that may affect firms’ decision to 
delist. The explanatory variables are lagged to minimize reverse causality problems and to increase 
the likelihood that causality flows from the explanatory variables to the dependent variable 
(endogeneity).  
The control variables are defined in Table 3. First, the number of listing years (i.e. the period 
between the IPO date and the delisting date) is included to control for two effects; the experience 
effect and the stability/financing effect. Firms that have been on the market for long may be more 
experienced in dealing with crisis and may thus be less likely to panic and exit the stock market in 
challenging times. Alternatively, these firms may represent mature, established firms with more 
analysts’ coverage and alternative funding sources (Merton, 1987; Baker   2002; Lang   
2003), and may therefore have a higher likelihood to delist should they consider the cost of remaining 
listed to be too high. The financing effect is further controlled for by including additional variables 
that may capture varying aspects of firms’ ability to source alternative capital since obtaining 
financing is one of the primary reasons why firms become public (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). The 
financing variables include: (1) return on equity, proxying for current profitability, which may 
contribute to retained earnings for internal financing; (2) financial leverage to proxy for borrowing 
ability; (3) seasoned equity offerings as a proxy for firms’ attractiveness to investors and possible 
presence of reserves from prior equity issues; and (4) log of total assets as a proxy for the size of 
firms’ internal capital market.10 
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Another set of controls included in the regression aims to account for firms’ growth prospects. 
Firms with higher growth prospects may need more funds to finance their growth opportunities and 
may thus be less willing to delist (Bancel and Mittoo, 2008; Aslan and Kumar, 2011; Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand, 2012). Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) show that growing firms from emerging market 
economies that need external funding to support their growth are willing to incur higher costs of 
listing in the US. This effect is captured by including the 3year average operating profit growth rate, 
capital expenditure intensity, net assets per share, and markettobook ratio. The markettobook ratio 
may also proxy for misvaluation (i.e. over or undervaluation) of the firm resulting from information 
asymmetry. 
Further, as discussed in subsection 3.1, public firms potentially suffer from agency problems 
that emanate from excessive CEO power and/or free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi  2017), 
and privatisation may serve as a tool for aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders. 
Therefore an indicator variable for CEO duality (i.e. CEOs doubling up as the Board Chair) and free 
cash flow variable are included to control for the agency effect on delisting. The freecash flow 
variable may also pick up some alternative financing effect. Lastly, year fixedeffect is controlled for 
by including dummies for the delisting years to account for macroeconomic factors that may influence 
corporate delisting transactions. Industry fixedeffect was not controlled for in the regression model 
since the peer firms were selected from the same industries as the delist sample.  
The baseline probit regression model in Eq. (1) is modified when testing 3 and when 
conducting additional robustness checks. For example, the model for testing 3 contains an additional 
interaction term between IAR and a financing variable, as shown in Eq. (2):                           
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Panel A of Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics for the study’s variables for the full 
sample and also separately for the delist and control samples. As displayed in the Table, the firms in 
the delist sample have a substantially higher investments in intangible assets compared with their 
counterparts in the control sample. Specifically, the intangible assets as a proportion of total assets is 
11% for the delist sample relative to 7.9% for the control sample, with the difference of 3.1% being 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This again provides early evidence in support of 3, in that, 
intangible investments seem to be positively associated with firms’ delisting decisions.  
Although the differences between the delist and control sample for the other variables were not 
statistically significant, firms that delisted from the stock exchanges generally had lower listing years, 
markettobook ratio, profitability growth rate, free cash flow, net assets per share, and capital 
expenditure intensity. These statistics suggests that delisting firms may be more naïve (inexperienced 
in stock market dealings), undervalued, with limited growth prospects. However, delisting firms 
appear to have better prospects of obtaining alternative financing by being larger and more attractive 
to investors (due to recent success in seasoned equity offerings), as well as having greater current 
profitability and leverage levels. These patterns are largely in line with 3. 
'()*+
+12)
0
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In Panel B of Table 4, the correlation matrix for the variables is presented, and observably, there 
is a statistically significant positive association between intangible investments and delisting 
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transactions. There also seem to be a positive (negative) association between corporate delisting 
activities and CEO duality, profitability, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings (listing 
years, markettobook ratio, profitability growth, freecash flow, net assets per share, and capital 
expenditure), albeit not statistically significant. Panel B of the table also shows low levels of 
correlation among the explanatory variables (all correlation coefficients are below 0.5), suggesting 
that multicolinearity may not pose any serious limitations on the multivariate regression analysis in 
the next section.         
 
5.22#	
Table 5 presents the results for the probit regressions for the effect of intangibles on corporate 
delisting decisions. The marginal effects (reported in the Table), relate to the partial effect of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of delisting, and help to directly interpret the coefficients as 
probabilities (see AgyeiBoapeah, 2017; Pour and Lasfer, 2013). In Model 1, the intangible asset ratio 
(IAR) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (coefficient=0.029; *#=0.002), 
suggesting that Chinese firms with high levels of intangible investments were more likely to delist 
from the US stock exchanges during the sample period. The marginal effect of the intangibles (IAR) is 
0.011, implying that a unit increase in intangible investment increases the probability of delisting by 
1.1%, on average. With the average sample firm having 9.5% of assets in intangibles, this result 
suggests a delisting probability of 11% (i.e. 0.01199.5) for a firm undertaking average levels of 
investments in intangible assets. 
The positive relationship between intangible investments and the delisting decision is consistent 
with theoretical predictions. That is, increased levels of intangible investments appear to be associated 
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with increased cost of remaining listed on stock exchanges, which emanates from an increased risk of 
financial statement manipulations by managers (Watts, 2003), greater analyst coverage (Barth  
2001) as well as higher analysts’ forecast errors (Amir  , 2003), and higher information 
asymmetry (Muller and Zimmermann, 2009; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), leading to the 
undervaluation/mispricing of such firms (Anagnostopoulou, 2008) and potential losses to their 
shareholders (Weir  2005b). In addition, the difficulties in objectively valuing intangible assets 
as well as their lack of collateral value appear to make it difficult for highintangible firms to access 
capital from investors when the market faces heightened uncertainty. Consequently, these factors 
together increase (reduce) the costs (net benefits) of staying listed on the exchange for highintangible 
firms, causing them to delist from the stock exchange.  
Overall, the broad implications of the findings are consistent with the generic costbenefit 
theoretic framework for understanding publictoprivate transactions (see Marosi and Massoud, 2007; 
Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). For example, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) posit that since the decision to 
go public is a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of listing, the delisting decision is also likely to 
be taken when the costs of listing exceed the benefits.  
'()*+
+12)
4
3)*)-        
In the next three Models of Table 5, tests for robustness of the results are conducted by measuring 
the primary explanatory variable, intangible investments, using different indicator variables. First, in 
Model 2, highintangible firms are defined to include a dummy for firms with abovemedian 
intangible investments. Similarly, in Models 3 and 4, the definition of highintangible firms is 
restricted to include only firms in the top 40% and 25% brackets for intangible investments, 
respectively. The results, reported in Table 5, confirm the strong positive impact of intangibles on the 
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ultimate delisting decisions of firms. Specifically, the probability of delisting from stock exchanges 
increases by between 1922% if firms are within the top tier for intangible investments. Collectively, 
these results offer empirical support for 3, as well as provide further support to the findings of 
previous studies (e.g. Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012; Pour and Laser, 
2013), which suggest that firms consider the costs and net benefits of listing in deciding whether to 
remain or delist from stock markets. Pour and Laser (2013) provide evidence to suggest that firms 
delist voluntarily from the London Stock Exchange when they fail to benefit from listing by not 
raising sufficient equity capital to rebalance their capital structure. In the US, Marosi and Massoud 
(2007) and Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the 
associated compliance costs are major determinants of corporate delisting decision by increasing the 
listing costs of public firms. In comparison, the findings of the present paper imply that listing costs 
(benefits) are higher (lower) for firms with higher investments in intangible assets.  
In terms of the control variables, firms that have been listed for more years and those with higher 
growth prospects (i.e., markettobook value, operating profit growth, net assets per share) seem to 
have a significantly reduced probability of delisting. Also, current profitability (measured as return on 
equity) appears to consistently have a positive and significant impact on the decision to delist. These 
results are generally in line with prior studies such as Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Pour and Lasfer 
(2013). 
Turning attention to the second empirical issue (H2), there is evidence that the presence of 
alternative sources of financing intangible projects may influence the intangiblesdelisting nexus, as 
shown in Table 6. As noted in section 4 [in specifying Eq. (2)], the IAR is interacted with each of the 
explanatory variables which could represent an alternative source of financing, namely; listing years, 
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return on equity, free cash flow, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings. The results are 
reported in Models 16 of Table 6. First, the number of years for which a firm has been listed (listing 
years) is negative and statistically significant at 99% confidence level, implying that Chinese firms 
with more experience of the stock exchange dealings are more likely to remain listed. More 
importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term (IAR*Listing years) is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% level, suggesting that even the experienced firms decide to delist when they have 
high investments in intangible assets. To the extent that these experienced firms with greater listing 
history, analyst coverage, and market exposure are more attractive to investors and could easily obtain 
capital elsewhere (see AgyeiBoapeah, 2015), then these results provide empirical support for 3. 
AgyeiBoapeah (2015) finds UK acquiring firms with significant experience in foreign markets to 
reap some financing advantages over their inexperienced counterparts.  
However, in Models 24, the interaction terms [(IAR*Return on Equity); (IAR*Free cash flow); 
and (IAR*Financial leverage)] though positive, lack statistical significance at conventional levels, and 
therefore inconsistent with 3. It is, however, possible that the current levels of profitability and free 
cash flow are not sufficient to fund intangible investment projects, thus, making firms reluctant to 
delist. Similarly, it may be that bondholders are less willing to fund intangible investments because of 
their lack of collateral value. Consequently, borrowing may not really be an alternative source of 
financing intangible assets. However, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) show that R&D projects are 
more likely to be funded from internal capital markets that are associated with large, diversified firms 
(AgyeiBoapeah, 2017). Consistent with this conjecture and 3, the results in Model 5 show that 
highintangible firms are more likely to delist from stock exchanges when they are large and likely to 
have a sizeable pool of internal capital market to finance their intangible investments internally. 
Page 21 of 47 International Journal of Accounting and Information Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of A
ccounting and Inform
ation M
anagem
ent
20 
 
Moreover, the individual effect of intangibles (without internal capital market) and firm size (without 
high intangible investments) on delisting decision are statistically negative, suggesting that even the 
highintangible firms stay listed if they may not be able to fund their intangible investments from their 
internal capital markets. These findings offer further support for 3. 
Finally, the influence of financing from a prior equity issue on the intangiblesdelisting nexus is 
considered. Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that firms raise a substantial amount of equity following 
crosslistings in the US, which helps them to build up a pool of reserves to fund future projects. 
Accordingly, 3 predicts that prior equity issues should reduce the net benefits of remaining listed, 
and thus increase the likelihood for such firms to delist when they carry high intangible assets. The 
results in Model 6 support this conjecture, with a positive and significant positive coefficient for the 
interaction term (IAR*Seasoned equity offerings) (coefficient=0.071; *#=0.005). This implies 
that when firms are likely to have a pool of equity capital from past equity issues, they are more likely 
to delist from stock markets when they have high levels of current intangible investments.  
Taken together, the results in Table 6 generally support the predictions of the proposed theoretical 
framework for this study which incorporates uncertainties in markets and valuation difficulties 
associated with intangible assets with the generic costbenefit theoretic framework of studies such as 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012). That is, the information 
asymmetry associated with intangible assets increases (reduces) the costs (net benefits) of remaining 
listed for firms with high levels of intangible investments. Thus, such firms tend to delist from the 
stock markets to protect their shareholders from losses, especially when they have alternative and 
potentially less costly ways of financing their intangible investment projects.                              
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Unlike current studies on the motives behind firms’ delisting decisions, which tend to focus 
largely on firms in developed economies and often ignoring the role of intangible assets, this study 
examines the predictive effect of intangible investments on corporate delisting decisions. In addition, 
it seeks to ascertain whether alternative sources of financing (other than raising new equity from the 
stock exchange) have a moderating effect on the intangiblesdelisting nexus. A peculiar feature of the 
paper is that it is conducted within the context of Chinese firms listed on US markets and focused on 
delisting announcements made during the recent period of 20102016. This period is characterised by 
heightened uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms due to a series of accounting 
fraud allegations made against Chinese public firms by US analysts. Given that intangible assets 
attract more analyst coverage/attention, and are associated with greater analyst forecast errors, as well 
as present managers with opportunities to manipulate financial statements, USlisted Chinese firms 
with large amounts of intangibles risk having their shares mispriced/undervalued and incurring 
significant losses. All else equal, such firms acting reasonably should have a greater incentive to delist 
from the stock market. 
Based on probit regression analysis controlling for a number of variables and year fixedeffects, 
and insights drawn from the asymmetric information and costbenefit theories of listing, the results 
are summarized as follows. Firstly, the results suggest that investment in intangible assets is a strong 
predictor of corporate delisting decisions for emerging market firms crosslisting on stock exchanges 
in advanced countries. This implies that emerging market firms with large intangibles do face 
additional listing costs on advanced markets when there is greater market uncertainty relating to 
accounting fraud. Secondly, the finding indicates that the relationship between intangible assets and 
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the likelihood for emerging market firms to exit advanced stock markets is contingent on the 
availability of alternative funding sources, particularly internal funding and prior equity issues. More 
specifically, the results show that the positive impact of intangibles on firms’ probability to delist is 
higher for larger firms with greater internal capital market, more listing years, and more reserves built 
up from prior seasoned equity issues. Thus, without surplus internal funds, highintangibles emerging 
market firms crosslisting on advanced markets may be forced to accept significant shareholder losses 
in periods of greater market uncertainty. The interpretation and implications of our results are largely 
consistent with expectations of the theoretical framework, which is based on insights from the 
asymmetric information, and costbenefit theories of listing. 
We make new contributions to the existing literature. Specifically, we contribute to the debate on 
the motivations behind the recent wave of delisting by Chinese firms from US markets by providing 
evidence to suggest that the reportage of US analysts on accounting fraud involving Chinese public 
firms may have increased the cost of remaining listed for firms with high investments in intangible 
assets. An implication of the finding is that in periods of high market uncertainty, firms with a 
significant investment in intangible assets risks destroying shareholders’ wealth if they remain listed 
on the stock exchange. Given the importance of intangible investments in promoting innovation and 
economic growth, this finding should be worrisome to policy makers. Accordingly, policy makers and 
standard setters must continue to work to improve the accounting regulations of intangible assets and 
to promote the adoption of global accounting standard across both emerging and advanced economies. 
Another key finding of the study is that the presence of alternative sources of funding helps to 
mitigate the listing costs in turbulent times. An important implication flowing from this finding is that 
public firms planning huge investments in intangibles should build up a reserve of internal funds as a 
Page 24 of 47International Journal of Accounting and Information Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of A
ccounting and Inform
ation M
anagem
ent
23 
 
hedge against any increased future costs of remaining listed should the market become more 
turbulent. Not having any funding reserves appears to leave public firms with no option but to remain 
on the stock exchange and reluctantly accept the underpricing of their shares. Therefore, market 
participants must keep an eye on the internal reserves of those public firms with huge investments in 
intangibles. 
Finally, inasmuch this paper makes important extensions to the literature, it is based on a limited 
sample and the specific context of Chinese firms listed on US markets during a period of heightened 
uncertainty due to accounting fraud allegations. Therefore, generalising the results outside this context 
should be done cautiously. Further studies could offer additional insights by utilizing a larger sample 
that considers several cases of accounting fraud allegations across countries over time for an analysis 
that will permit generalisation to a larger extent. In addition, the focus of this paper did not extend to 
the valuation implications of the delisting firms, making it unclear whether the market considers 
delisting by highintangible firms to be the “best” (valueenhancing) decision. This could again serve 
as a potential avenue of future research, which could utilise eventstudy methodologies to examine 
this issue.   
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 %<
 %%
 %.

Intangible assets ratio (%) =.> <&%.0.
 1.0000   
Listing years =/> 0.1175 0.0348 1.0000 
        
  
Markettobook ratio =0> 0.0658 0.0649 0.0553 1.0000   
CEO duality =4> 0.0338 0.0719 0.1124 0.0137 1.0000 
      
  
Operating profit growth (%) =5> 0.0885 0.0090 0.0782 0.0216 0.0394 1.0000   
ROE (%) =B> 0.0965 ;<&/B94
 0.0714 <&%5BB
 ;<&%4B.
 0.0770 1.0000 
    
  
Free cash flow =:> 0.0079 0.1171 0.0794 <&%95/
 0.0720 0.1093 <&0409
 1.0000   
Net assets per share
=9> 0.0807 0.0980 <&%B:B
 0.0877 0.0299 0.0299 <&%..4
 <&%..B
 1.0000 
  
  
Leverage (%) =%<> 0.0135 0.0192 <&./B0
 <&%:.B
 0.0030 0.0816 0.1052 0.1072 0.0299 1.0000   
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Firm size =%%> 0.0179 0.0467 0.2480 <&%BB/
 0.1085 0.0402 <&.4B%
 <&/0//
 <&.B90
 <&./B4
 1.0000   
Capex (%)
=%.> 0.0665 0.0038 0.0209 0.0127 0.0243 0.0963 0.0280 ;<&.5:%
 0.0082 0.0571 0.0511 1.0000 
Seasoned equity offerings =%/> 0.0395 0.0116 0.1067 0.0061 0.0538 0.0965 0.0380 0.0791 0.0042 0.1075 <&%45/
 0.0609 
Variables are defined in Table 4. In Panel A, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In Panel B, figures in bold denote statistical significance at conventional levels (i.e. 10% or 
below). 
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	
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 
		
 =.>
 
		
 =/>
 
		
 =0>
 
		

                
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) 0.0286*** 0.011 
        (0.002) 
Abovemedian IAR firm dummy 
  
0.5685*** 0.224 
      (0.006) 
Top 40% IAR firm dummy 
    
0.5018** 0.198 
    (0.018) 
Top 25% IAR firm dummy 
      
0.4955** 0.195 
  (0.040) 
Listing years 0.0499* 0.020 0.0483* 0.019 0.0455 0.018 0.0468* 0.019 
  (0.071) (0.093) (0.111) (0.097) 
Markettobook value 0.0488* 0.019 0.0500* 0.020 0.0451* 0.018 0.0426* 0.017 
  (0.056) (0.055) (0.091) (0.098) 
CEO duality 0.2361 0.094 0.2062 0.082 0.1543 0.061 0.1888 0.075 
  (0.266) (0.318) (0.450) (0.365) 
Average operating profit growth 0.0005* 0.000 0.0005** 0.000 0.0005** 0.000 0.0005* 0.000 
  (0.054) (0.034) (0.040) (0.084) 
Return on equity 0.0080*** 0.003 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014) 
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Free cash flow 0.0051 0.002 0.0046 0.002 0.0060 0.002 0.0058 0.002 
  (0.568) (0.607) (0.501) (0.507) 
Net assets per share 0.0228* 0.009 0.0198 0.008 0.0211* 0.008 0.0198 0.008 
  (0.088) (0.101) (0.083) (0.114) 
Financial leverage 0.0035 0.001 0.0038 0.002 0.0031 0.001 0.0028 0.001 
  (0.451) (0.416) (0.504) (0.546) 
Firm size 0.0402 0.016 0.0306 0.012 0.0378 0.015 0.0412 0.016 
  (0.630) (0.713) (0.644) (0.617) 
Capital expenditure intensity 0.3765 0.002 0.4339 0.002 0.3591 0.001 0.3730 0.001 
  (0.333) (0.262) (0.350) (0.326) 
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1212 0.048 0.1654 0.066 0.1057 0.042 0.1316 0.052 
  (0.609) (0.491) (0.657) (0.575) 
Year fixedeffect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
   … … … … 
Constant 0.4851 
 
0.5059 
 
0.4192 
 
0.3751 
   (0.593) (0.578) (0.640) (0.679) 
              
 
  
(&

	
 182   182   182   182   
*;C	
 0.092   0.084   0.075   0.070   
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are utilised in the 
probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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	 =%>
 =.>
 =/>
 =0>
 =4>
 =5>

  
     
  
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) 0.0007 0.0304*** 0.0291*** 0.0131 0.3408*** 0.0179* 
  (0.961) (0.002) (0.002) (0.369) (0.000) (0.080) 
IAR * Listing years 0.0059**   
  (0.014) 
    
  
IAR * Return on equity 0.0001   
  
 
(0.363) 
   
  
IAR * Free cash flow 0.0007   
  
  
(0.224) 
  
  
IAR * Financial leverage 0.0005   
  
   
(0.220) 
 
  
IAR * Firm size 0.0356***   
  
    
(0.000)   
IAR * Seasoned equity offerings 0.0711*** 
  
     
(0.005) 
Listing years 0.1064*** 0.0490* 0.0504* 0.0480* 0.0535* 0.0487* 
  (0.003) (0.078) (0.071) (0.086) (0.075) (0.082) 
Markettobook value 0.0559** 0.0428 0.0410 0.0611** 0.0377 0.0443* 
  (0.034) (0.129) (0.136) (0.037) (0.197) (0.086) 
CEO duality 0.3002 0.2363 0.2177 0.2412 0.3157 0.2689 
  (0.163) (0.265) (0.308) (0.253) (0.152) (0.205) 
Average operating profit growth 0.0006* 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005** 0.0006* 0.0006** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.047) (0.073) (0.031) 
Return on equity 0.0097*** 0.0058 0.0063* 0.0101*** 0.0068* 0.0076*** 
  (0.000) (0.159) (0.052) (0.001) (0.055) (0.002) 
Free cash flow 0.0063 0.0047 0.0093 0.0064 0.0064 0.0078 
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  (0.486) (0.599) (0.333) (0.475) (0.528) (0.380) 
Net assets per share 0.0263* 0.0230* 0.0204* 0.0220* 0.0258* 0.0204 
  (0.066) (0.087) (0.098) (0.090) (0.082) (0.116) 
Financial leverage 0.0048 0.0041 0.0036 0.0004 0.0046 0.0043 
  (0.302) (0.384) (0.438) (0.946) (0.360) (0.354) 
Firm size 0.0421 0.0330 0.0274 0.0398 0.2231** 0.0359 
  (0.617) (0.695) (0.743) (0.630) (0.023) (0.668) 
Capital expenditure intensity 0.4872 0.3080 0.3258 0.4276 0.3761 0.4150 
  (0.218) (0.439) (0.404) (0.285) (0.339) (0.292) 
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1213 0.1032 0.0921 0.1434 0.0731 0.3843 
  (0.618) (0.666) (0.700) (0.549) (0.771) (0.228) 
Year fixedeffect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  … … … … … … 
Constant 0.2055 0.4475 0.3691 0.3570 2.0449* 0.3478 
  (0.823) (0.622) (0.684) (0.694) (0.051) (0.705) 
  
     
  
(&

	
 182 182 182 182 182 182 
*;C	
 0.112 0.094 0.096 0.097 0.163 0.117 
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are 
utilised in the probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1As discussed in Pour and Lasfer (2015), a voluntary delisting is one that is initiated by a firm upon agreement with its shareholders (concurring votes from 75% of 
shareholders at a general meeting). 
2Intangible assets are more difficult to value resulting in high information asymmetry between firms and investors (see Anagnostopoulou’s (2008)’s review). International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 sets out the recognition and measuring criteria, as well as, the disclosure requirements for intangible assets, defined as identifiable non
monetary assets without physical form. Examples of intangible assets include computer software, licenses, trademarks, patents, copyrights, goodwill, research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, etc. 
3The few available Chinese studies are either theoretical in nature or based on single case study analysis, thus, lacking empirical analysis to provide persuasive evidence to 
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support those theories/perspectives (e.g. Liu  2016; Zhang, 2012). 
4The full report can be accessed via this link: http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/content/uploads/2010/06/ONP_Report_June2010.pdf 
5Orient Paper Inc. (ONP) forms part of our control sample for the empirical analysis. ONP listed on the New York Stock Exchange on 17th December 2009 and remained 
listed as at the time of our data collection.  
 
6Detailed report can be obtained from this link: http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/reports/Evergrande_Report.pdf 
7iMeigu (http://www.imeigu.com/), Hexun (http://www.hexun.com/), and Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/). 
8The  financial database is a leading source of economic and financial data on China and Chinese firms. It integrates the most comprehensive and accurate market data, 
fundamental data, research, news, and analytics tools across all asset classes in China, and provides investment professionals with the data and insights they need to 
understand China's complex capital markets and economy. 
 
9These include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System 
(NASDAQ), and other Over the Counter (OTC) markets. 
10Dropping firm size as a control variable from the regression model did not change our results and conclusions qualitatively. We decide to include it to limit the possibility of 
omitted variable problems. More so, models including the firm size variable seemed to have higher explanatory power (as indicated by the Pseudo Rsquare statistic) 
compared with those without firm size. 
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